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I.

STATEMENT OF THE ~, .. ~~

Employer/Surety ("Employer") does not dispute the accuracy of the Statement of Facts
contained in Wilson's Opening Brief Moreover, Employer failed to negate such unrebutted and
cited facts. Likewise, Employer failed to repudiate the controlling judicial and statutory law
cited and relied upon by Wilson throughout her Opening Brief
Conversely, through its Response Brief, Employer purports to present appellate
arguments/assertions premised almost entirely on, supposition, false dichotomies, revisionist
history and selective omissions. Similarly, the Response reveals that rather than reference
controlling, current legal authority, Employer merely opts to revise assertions that have been
summarily rejected by the Supreme Court of Idaho. Such a distraction strategy, merely serves to
reveal the underlying, fundamental and insunnountable factual as well as legal deficiencies
integral to Employer's position.
By way of example, in its Statement of Facts, Employer purports to impugn Wilson's
credibility through implication that she waited too long to seek out medical care "despite her
later allegation of severe and debilitating back symptoms dating back to mid-March." See,
Respondents' 9/17/15 Response Brief, pg. 2. Employer does not provide any record citation for
this assertion, as it is a misstatement of the unrebutted facts in evidence. The unrefuted medical
and testimonial evidence documents that while shoveling on or about March 16, 2011, Wilson
felt the sudden onset of pain in her lmv back, which continued to worsen thereafter and that
Wilson eventually sought medical treatment in April of 2011, because "It was getting worse."
Hr'g Ex. J, pg. 104; (Tr., p. 70, LL 1-3; p. 71, Ll. 5-6; p. 74, LI. 2-9); (Wilson Depo., p. 33, LL
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12-18

p. 34. LI. 17-22: p. 72, LL 6-10). Employer also fails to disclose that during a recorded

interview with Employer's AdjusteL Wilson specifically stated "As the weeks went on it just got
worse and worse and worse." Hr'g Ex. P, pg.310.
In an attempt to interject illusory "sources of her back pain", Employer infers, again
without citation to the record, that Wilson experienced on-going back problems since 2008 by
stating "she acknowledged that she experienced problems with her back since approximately
2008 ... " See, Respondents' 9/17/15 Response Brief, pg. 2. As a matter of record, Wilson
provided unrebutted testimony that with respect to her prior 2008 back issues, she did not have
any low back surgeries prior to moving to Idaho in 2009 and described her low back as "fine"
and "It got completely better." (Tr., p. 61, Ll. 16-18; p. 103, LI. 17-20). Employer likewise fails
to disclose that the initial April 11, 2011, Family Health Services treatment note recorded that
following the 2008 treatment, ''She has been fine ... "

Hr' g Ex. J, pg. 104. As permeated

throughout its administrative and appellate postulations, Employer completely failed to present
any reliable medical evidence that Wilson suffered on-going problems related to her 2008 back
issues.
Through the remainder of its Statement of Facts, Employer proceeds to argue an
"alternative" theory that an industrial accident and injuries did not transpire on or about March
16, 2011, because Wilson failed to subjectively perceive the legalistic nature of her injuries. In
this instance, Employer fails to address or even contemplate controlling law applicable in such
circumstances.

Again, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically rebuked such extrapolations in

unequivocally declaring that an injured ,vorker's "personal and practical" view of a work-related
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accident or injury are not controlling. as such a detennination "requires a legal conclusion that
a claimant is not required to resolve." See, Page v. 1HcCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342, 346,
109 P.3d 1084 (2005) (emphasis added). Further, Employer's assertions belie the actual facts, in
that the record evidence documents Wilson repeatedly referred to the March 16, 2011, workrelated incident as having "aggravated the old injury," which, pursuant to controlling law,
constitutes a compensable "injury" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act. (Tr., p. 7 6,
LI. 2-3); (Wilson Depo. Tr., p. 60, LI. 13-17); Hr'g Ex. N, pg. 245; Nistad v. Winton Lumber
Co., 59 Idaho 533, 536, 85 P.2d 236 (1938) (Aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting disease

or ,veakened condition is coinpensable if caused by the industrial accident).
Unfortunately, throughout the remainder of its Response Brief~ Employer, in large part,
fails and/or refuses to directly address Wilson's appellate arguments. Rather, Employer's
briefing seemingly constitutes more of the same distraction strategy without regard for the actual
evidence in record or the applicability of controlling law. Regrettably, as with the underlying
administrative proceedings, Employer appears to do little more than invite the Court to substitute
the unrebutted factual record and controlling law with false dichotomies 1 and supposition.

1 "The

reasoning is a species of argumcntum ad ignorantiam, a fancier and hence less denigrating, way of describing
'an argument from ignorance.' An argument from ignorance is 'the mistake that is committed whenever it is argued
that a proposition is trne simply on the basis that it has not been proved false, or that it is false because it has not
been proved true." Irving M. Copi & Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic 93 (s1" ed. 1990). Our point is that
difficulty in proving a proposition ... does not prove its opposite. Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v.
Kemptlwrne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1257(11 th Cir. 2007) (quotations original) (italics original) (emphasis added).
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II.

ARGUMENT and AUTHORITY

The Court \vill not consider appeal issues which are not supported by propositions of
law, authority, or argument. Langley v. State, 126 Idaho 781, 784, 890 P.2d 732 (1995). ''A
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both
are lacking." State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263,923 P.2d 966 (1996) (emphasis added).

The

provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act must be liberally construed ''in favor of the
employees in order to serve the humane purposes for which it was promulgated." fVernecke v.
St. Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009) (citations omitted).

"Doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of the worker who has been injured." Combs v.
Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572 (I 989) (citation omitted).
A.

The Industrial Commission Erred in Concluding that Ouasi-Estoppel did not
Preclude Employer/Suretv from Contesting that Wilson Suffered
Compensable \Vork-Related Injuries on or about March 16, 2011.

Quasi-estoppel precludes Employer from contesting that Claimant suffered low back
injuries/aggravations resulting from the work-related shoveling accident on or about March 16,
2011. Employer failed to present any quasi-estoppel assertions premised upon the application of
controlling law to the objective facts in this case.
Initially, Employer purports to "confess that they may not fully understand Claimant's
estoppel arguments." See, Respondents' 9/17 /15 Response Brief, pg. 18. Curiously, Employer
did not feign any such confusion when addressing Wilson's quasi-estoppel arguments in posthearing briefing before the Industrial Commission.

See, Defs' 9/26/14 Post-Hr'g Response

Brief, pgs. 17-20. Unfortunately, as with the Industrial Commission, it appears that Employer is
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now attempting to sidestep facts in evidence, as well as the proper application of controlling law,
by engaging in revisionist history.
Specifically, despite the fact that Wilson premised her quasi-estoppel arguments upon
Employer's prior Title 72 Unemployment position that she suffered "on-the-job injuries" and
failed to report such, Employer now embarks on an attempt to revise its position in terms of an
''accident." See, Respondents' 9/17/15 Response Brief, pg. 18. Even more disconcerting, is that

Employer's newly adopted "accident" position, as now proffered to this Court, is inconsistent
with the positions Employer adopted during both of the underlying Industrial Commission
administrative proceeding.
By way of example, the actual, unrebutted evidence of record proves that Employer fired
Wilson via its April 19, 2011, "Termination Notification" therein setting forth a specific basis
of "Failing to immediately report on-th(sic]-the-job injuries." Hr'g Ex. 0, pg. 304 (emphasis
original). Controlling legal authority establishes that under these circumstances, this document
is, in and of itself, sufficient for the invocation of quasi-estoppel.

Greenlieart,

See generally, Brown v.

Idaho_, 335 P.3d 1 (2014). Further, throughout the Title 72 Unemployment

proceedings, in keeping with the "on-the-job" injury basis of its "Tern1ination Notification,"
Employer's official "Response" to the Commission invoked the "injury" premise on at least
eighteen (18) occasions, without any corollary reference to an "accident" Hr' g Ex. N, pgs. 24647. Moreover, during the Title 72 Unemployment proceedings, Employer declared:
I suspended her that day until further investigation as work related injuries are to be
reported ... the Dr. is adamant that she did tell him that she was injured at work and
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notes reflect that
a work related injury.

. . Failed to

rules

period on

Hr'g Ex. N, pgs. 246-47 (emphasis added). Similarly, during the Title 72 Work Comp posthearing briefing, at one point, Employer conceded that "The issue before the unemployment
board was whether or not Claimant violated ConAgra's internal personnel reporting policies by
failing to report an alleged work related injury .. " See, Defs' 9/26/14 Post-Hr'g Response
Brief, pg. 19.
Now, Employer dubiously asserts to the Cou11 that "Accordingly, Claimant was
tenninatcd for violation of eompany policy requiring an immediate reporting of industrial

accidents." See, Respondents' 9/17/15 Response Brief, pg. 18. Controlling law mandates that
the application of quasi-estoppel is premised upon Employer's actual "original position ...

previously taken."
added).

Allen v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812, 186 P .3d 663 (2008) ( emphasis

Furthennore, Employer cannot escape the Court's dictates that "The doctrine of quasi

estoppel 'prevents a party from asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is
inconsistent with a position previously taken."' Vawter v. UPS, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d
893, 900 (2014) (citations omitted) (quotations original).

This seems to be a quintessential

scenario of a party "playing fast and loose with the com1s," thereby necessitating the application
of quasi-estoppel as a matter of law and equity.
Finally, Employer once again incongruously asserts that any application of quasi-estoppel
should be against Wilson, because of her initial, uneducated, subjective perception \Vas that she
did not believe that the March 16, 2011, industrial accident caused new work-related injuries, but
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rather personally believed it just ''aggravated" an old injury. Regrettably, Employer's arguments
arc once again completely devoid of any reliance upon controlling law and not premised on the
recorded evidence, presumably because none exists.
Quite to the contrary, as a matter of record, during the Title 72 Unemployment
proceedings, the Industrial Commission's own Examiner actually educated and adduced Wilson
into understanding that her subjective conceptualization as to what transpired on or about March
16, 2011, constituted a work-related injury:
I did not feel that it was a work related injury, I just thought that I had aggravated
the old injury that I had.
Q. Did shoveling potatoes make your back sore? Yes
Q. Would the soreness in your back not be a work related injury? Yes, I guess now
that I think of it, it was an injury at work.
Hr'g Ex. N, pg. 245 (emphasis added). To that end, as established through 80 years of legal
precedent, in repeatedly declaring a work-related "aggravation" of a pre-existing low back
condition( s), Wilson was in fact asserting an industrial accident with resulting injuries for
purposes of the Act. Nistad v. Winton Lumber Co., 59 Idaho 533, 536, 85 P.2d 236 (1938)
(Aggravation or acceleration of a preexisting disease or weakened condition is compensable if
caused by the industrial accident), see also, Bowman v. Twin Falls Const. Co., 99 Idaho 312,
581 P.2d 770 ( 1978).

As before, the Idaho Supreme Court unequivocally declared that an

injured worker's ''personal and practical" view of a work-related accident or injury are not
controlling, as such a detennination "requires a legal conclusion that a claimant is not

required to resolve." Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 342,346, 109 P.3d 1084 (2005)
( emphasis added).
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Remarkably, Employer failed to dispute that in the event that the Court finds and/or
invokes quasi-estoppcl, then the remainder of the Commission's compensability findings and
conclusions are rendered moot.2 Rather, Employer reveris to obtusely proclaiming an inability to
understand these legal and equitable ramifications, which seemingly defies any semblance of
plausibility. Moreover, Employer also did not dispute that it gained an advantage in avoiding
payment of unemployment benefits during the prior 2011 Unemployment proceedings, nor that it
would be unconscionable/inhumane for it to reap a second benefit by deliberately adopting an
inconsistent position during the Work Comp proceedings.
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is applicable to the facts of this case.

Employer

completely failed to present any controlling law or actual facts in evidence to the contrary.
Moreover, Employer deliberately adopted inconsistent positions throughout the Title 72
Industrial Commission Unemployment and Work Comp proceedings, as well as the instant
appellate litigation before the Court. Therefore, the Commission's February 20, 2015, Decision
and Order must be reversed and remanded with respect to the quasi-estoppel findings, therein
ordering that Employer/Surety are estopped from contesting that Wilson suffered industrial
injuries while shoveling for Employer on or about March 16, 2011.

2

Simply stated, if Employer is estopped from adopting a position that Wilson did not suffer lumbar injuries as a
result of the work-related shoveling on or about March 16, 2011, and the Commission cannot sua .spontc interject
such on Employer's behalf, then, the issue of an "accident" is likewise subsumed via Legislative fiat (LC. § 72-102
( 18)(a)), thereby rendering compensability moot in Wilson's case.
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B.

The Industrial Commission Erred in Refusing to Address, or Otherwise
Invoke the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel.

Judicial

Estoppel

precludes Employer from

contesting that Claimant suffered

compensable injuries resulting from the industrial, work-related shoveling accident on or about
March 16, 2011. "[O]ne who ... has taken a particular position deliberately in the course of
litigation, must act consistently with it; one cannot play fast and loose ... he or she will not be
pennitted to benefit from that deception" McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 153 and 156, 937
P .2d 1222 (1997) (emphasis added).

The Court has been unequivocal in ruling that "when

reviewing the decision of the Commission, this Court is 'limited to the evidence, theories and
arguments' that were presented to the Commission below ... Consequently, we 'will not

consider ar6ruments raised for the first time on appeal.'" Serrano v. Four Seasons Framing,
157 Idaho 309, 315, 336 P.3d 242 (2014) (quotations original) (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). As in this case, the Court has had occasion to reaffirm that when a surety fails to raise an
argument before the Commission, "It is well established that arguments raised for the first time
on appeal will not be heard." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 698, 769 P.2d 572
(1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Employer failed to present any viable judicial

estoppel assertions, and is otherwise precluded from making any such arguments as part of this
appeal.
As with its quasi-estoppel assertions, Employer fails to cite to any actual evidence
in record or specific controlling la\v 3 , instead deflecting to its newly adopted "accident"

Employer actually defers to Wilson's quasi-estoppel and judicial estoppel legal arguments, thereby apparently
conceding the issues. See, Appellants' 9/17 ! 15 Response Brief, pg. 20.
3
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position. Again, for all the reasons set forth infi·a, the Employer's deliberate proffer of
ever-ernlving, inconsistent positions in various administrative forums and nmv before
this Court seems to be an unmitigated example of a party "playing fast and loose with the
courts," thereby warranting the invocation of judicial estoppel as a matter of equity.
Robertson Supply, Inc., v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99,101,952 P.2d 914 (1998) (citations

omitted).
Regardless, a review of the record reveals that identical to the presiding Referee
and the Industrial Commission, other than merely mentioning the doctrine in passing on
one occasion, Employer failed to proffer any specific "judicial estoppel" controlling legal
authority or arguments during the underlying Title 72 Work Comp proceeding.

See,

Defs' 9/26/14 Post-Hr'g Response Brief, pgs. 17-22. In her prior post-hearing Reply
Brief to the Commission, Wilson specifically pointed out:
Further, Defendants failed to directly contest the applicability of judicial estoppel,
and thereby acquiesced to its applicability and preclusive effect. 318 P.3d at 901
("because [Defendant] failed to address the timeliness of [Claimant's] argument
as to quasi-estoppel, when [Claimant] actually raised it, [Defendants] are not
permitted to do so now.").
See, Clmt's 10/9/14 Post-Hr'g Reply Brief, pg. 5. As such, in accord with controlling la\v, any

"comments" that Employer purports to offer on the issue of judicial estoppel in its appellate
Response Brief are seemingly academic and otherwise barred from consideration.

Thus,

Employer ostensibly concedes the viability and appropriateness of invoking judicial estoppel in
this instance.
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Invocation and application of judicial cstoppel by the Court is appropriate in this case.
Moreover, Employer is precluded from, and otherwise failed to rebut, Wilson's factually
substantiated and legally supported arguments for the invocation of judicial estoppeL As such,
Wilson respectfully requests that the Court invoke judicial estoppcl against Employer, the
Commission andlor both, therein ordering that they are estopped from contesting that Wilson
suffered lumbar injuries while working for Employer on or about March 16, 2011.
C.

The Industrial Commission's Credibility, Accident, Injurv and Medical
Causations Findings/Conclusions are Not Supported bv Substantial and
Competent Evidence.

The overwhelming preponderance of objective, reliable, and corroborated evidence
proves that Wilson suffered a work-related accident causing physical injuries on or about March
16, 2011. With respect to Industrial Commission proceedings, it is a "fundamental ... principle
that fact finding in contested cases is governed exclusively by the record of the hearing."
/Mazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 ldaho 750,761,302 P.3d 718 (2013) (citation omitted)
( emphasis added). "An agency that uses its specialized knowledge as a substitute for evidence
will not have it order sustained." 1Uazzone v. Texas Roadhouse, Inc., 154 Idaho at 761-62

( citation omitted) ( emphasis added). "[ A]n order of the Commission must be set aside where
the law is misapplied to the evidence." Combs v. Kelly Logging, 115 Idaho 695, 697, 769 P.2d
572 (1989) (emphasis added). As is systemic throughout, Employer failed to present credibility
or "substantial and competent evidence" arguments premised upon the application of controlling
law to the objective, unrebutted evidence in this case.
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Correspondingly, Employer failed to directly address Wilson's factually and legally
based arguments. Notably, Employer failed to dispute:
•

That as a matter of lmv, Claimant is "observationally" credible;

•

That the Foust premises legal presumption is applicable in this case;

•

That other than listing such under a boiler plate heading, the Commission failed to
consider and/or incorporate Christopher Lehmann's hearing testimony;

•

That Mr. Lehmann's testimony corroborates Wilson's testimony;

•

That as a matter of law, Mr. Lehmann is "observationally" and "substantially"
credible;

•

That Wilson's hearing testimony was consistent with that provided throughout the
prior 2011 Title 72 Unemployment proceedings and during her December 18, 2012,
deposition;

•

That during the prior 2011 Title 72 Unemployment proceedings, the Commission's
Examiner educated and adduced Wilson into recognizing that what she experienced
on or about March 16, 2011, were work-related injuries;

•

That the Commission attributed a misstated and mischaracterized statement to
Wilson, which was \Vholly inaccurate and reflective of the actual record;

•

That in April of 2011, Dr. Christensen's Nurse advised Employer's Occupational
Nurse that Wilson suffered a work-related low back injuries due to a "shoveling
incident three weeks earlier;"

•

That the Stevens-McAtee, Page, Vawter, Corgatelli, and Anderson decisions
constitute controlling and persuasive authority in this case; and

•

That Dr. Christensen provided an unrebutted oral opinion that the need for the
surgeries he performed on Wilson's low back were due to the March 16, 2011,
shoveling accident.
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At their premise, Employer's credibility and "substantial and competent evidence" assertions
appear to be little more than a laudatory recitation of the Commission's February 20, 2015,
Findings, Conclusions and Order, interspersed with copious speculation and false dichotomies.
From the onset, it is clear that the central premise to Employer's assertions is the false
dichotomy that Wilson actually suffered the injuries, necessitating Dr. Christensen's surgical
intervention, sometime in September or October of 2010. Notably, Employer docs not dispute
that Wilson actually suffered lumbar injuries/aggravations necessitating Dr. Christensen's
surgical intervention.

Instead, Employer speculates that "The medical records suggest that

Claimant complained of an injury in the fall of 2010, although she never reported it ... Claimant
could have injured her back in September 2010 and then completely failed to report it. It could
also be possible that she never had a back injury at ConAgra ... " See, Respondents' 9/17 /l 5
Response Brief, pgs. 10-11. As an aside, the corollary to this false dichotomy is an argument
from Wilson to the effect that every doctor/surgeon who did not affinnatively refute that her
subject lumbar injuries/aggravations resulted from the March 16, 2011, industrial accident, must,
necessarily be of the opinion that the work-related March 16, 2011, accident caused the subject
lumbar injuries/aggravations.

"[D]ifficulty in proving a proposition ... does not prove its

opposite. 4" Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coalition v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d at 1257. The fatal
deficit to Employer's "could have," "suggest," ''It could also be possible" etc. postulations, is
that true to the nature of false dichotomies, they present absolutely no factual, nor any medical
opinions/evidence, on a probable basis, to affinnatively prove such.
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Astoundingly, even the Commission recognized that Employer's own medical expert
"report docs not reflect that he considered Claimant's October 10 l O low back treatment in
rendering his opinion."

R., pg. 18.

Conversely, the Commission conceded that Wilson's

medical expert, "Dr. Verska testified that he did have the opportunity to review the October 2010
chart notes in fonnulating his opinions." R., pg. 18. Notably, Employer actually tried to adduce
such an opinion from Dr. Verska, to no avail. (Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p.39, LI. 25

pg. 43, LI.

15). As such, it is indisputable that Employer's "woulda, shoulda, coulda" September/October
2010, false dichotomies are little more than unalloyed conjecture, devoid of any legitimate
medical or factual substantiation.
Similarly, without setting fo1ih the pertinent portions of the medical records, Employer
espouses a "6-month spread of time" false dichotomy, speculating therein "Claimant's flare-up
of low back pain could have begun," as a purported refutation to the overwhelming medical,
factual and testimonial evidence establishing that Wilson experienced back injuries on or about
March 16, 2011, while shoveling potatoes for Employer. See, Respondents' 9/17 /15 Response
Briet pg. 15. Employer also espoused that "Claimant told Family Health services on April 5,
2011 that she had ongoing right-sided sciatic nerve pain with right leg radiculopathy for the

prior 6 months." See, Respondents' 9/17/15 Response Brief, pg. 10 (emphasis added). Again,
this is a misstatement of the actual evidence, in that the subject April 5, 2011, medical record sets
forth in pertinent part:

No injured worker will ever be able to establish coverage under the Act if they were forced to disprove every
unsubstantiated theory/false dichotomy proffered by the Commission or an Employer/Surety.

4
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has been fine and had no imaging or
2008 .. [A ]pproximately 6
months ago, she had this right sciatic nerve pain vvhich went down to her heel. She
was treated for this and did feel quite a bit better until
l to 2
ago ... She
states that she was shoveling at work and this happened. She states that she feels
like this both right and left sciatic nerve ... she states that she has just been working
quite hard and there is a lot of manual labor, and this happened again just
recently.
Hr' g Ex. J, pg. I 04 (emphasis added).

Obviously, this entry does not declare that Wilson

suffered "ongoing" pain "for the prior 6 months," but rather she "did feel quite a bit better."
Moreover, in proffering this false dichotomy, Employer noticeably fails to address the unrebutted
fact that during this "6-month spread of time," Wilson did not receive any treatment for her low
back until after the subject March 16,201 I, work-related accident/injury(ies). In fact, during the
interim, Wilson sought medical treatment at Family Health Services on October 17, 2010, and
the attending medical professional noted "She is in no acute distress" and did not document any
low back issues whatsoever. Hr'g Ex. J, pg. 100.
Further, Employer's false dichotomy fails to account for the unrebutted fact that Wilson
continued to shovel potatoes on a daily basis during the ''6-month spread of time," up through
the subject March 16, 2011, industrial accident/injury(ies). (Tr., p. 66, Ll.22-24; 68, LI. 9-13).
Significantly, in espousing this false dichotomy, Employer conspicuously failed to acknowledge
the only unrebutted medical opinions/evidence directly addressing said "6-month spread of
time." As previously established, in addition to incorporating the October 2010 medical records
into his opinions, Dr. Verska was the only physician/surgeon to specifically address whether
Wilson could have performed her shoveling duties on a daily basis for the intervening months
between September/October of 2010 and March 16, 2011, testifying:
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Q. Based on your professional medical experience, would it have been possible for
Amanda to perfonn her work-related shoveling duties on a daily basis for approximately
five months with the lumbar conditions ultimately, diagnosed by Dr. Christensen?
A. I don't think so. I have had a disc herniation in my back that required surgery
... I could barely walk. And I tried therapy and injections and steroids and
there's no way in hell you can shovel ... you can barely \Valk 30 feet ... I don't
think that she could do any shoveling not with that size of disc anyway. I think
it would be pretty unlikely.
(Dr. Verska Depo Tr., p. 21, Ll. 15

~

pg. 22, LI. 3) (emphasis added). As before, Employer

purported "inconsistencies" are false dichotomies, thereby lacking medical, factual or legal
con-oboration.
Unfortunately, despite explicit Idaho Supreme Court admonitions, it appears that both the
presiding Referee and the Commission embraced Employer's "September/October 2010" false
dichotomies. Of note, the presiding Referee determined that "Without medical opinion which
includes consideration of the October 2010 medical care, Claimant failed to show it likely that
any aspect of her back condition was caused or aggravated by a March or April 2011 industrial
accident 5"

and

then

proceeded to

sua sponte interject the September/October 2010

defense/theory into the hearing issues. See, Referee's 1/29115 Findings & Recommendations,
pg. 11.

This administrative incongruity can-ied over into the February 20, 2015, Findings,

Conclusions and Order, wherein the Commission interjected the Referee's sua sponte
September/October defense/theory into the case. R., pg. 19.

5

Given that the evidence in record reveals Dr. Verska actually considered "the October 2010 medical care" in
rendering his causation opinions, the fact that this inaccurate false dichotomy was used as the fundamental premise
of formal Recommendations to the Commission seemingly defies reasonable explanation. (Dr. Verska Depa Tr., p.
17, LI. 17 -- pg. 18, LI. 3; p.39, LI. 25 - pg. 43, LI. 15).
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It would appear that such administrative conduct contravenes the Court's recent

reprimand that it "takes a dim view of fact-finding tribunals raising defenses or theories sua

sponte. Theories and defenses should be detennined by the parties, not the tribunal.'' Deon v.
H&J Inc., _

Idaho _ , 339 P.3d 550, 556 (2014) (emphasis added).

Likewise, this

presumably transgressed the Court's mandate to the Commission that it must "render an
impartial decision based upon the evidence in record and the law ... " Mazzoue, 154 Idaho at
760-61 (emphasis added). Obviously, Employer had the opportunity to medically substantiate its
"September/October 201 O" speculation, but failed to do so, even through its own medical expert.
Clearly, it was not appropriate for the presiding Referee, or the Commission to substitute such
conjecture and false dichotomies for the actual medical evidence/opinions in record.
Even more disconcerting is the reality that both the presiding Referee and the
Commission seemingly utilized Employer's "September/October 20 IO" false dichotomies as a
means to either directly or indirectly discount Dr. Verska's opinions.

Even Employer

acknowledged that 'The commission also expressed concern that Claimant's history given to Dr.
Verska may have been incomplete in that he was not advised of Claimant's low back treatment
in the fall of 201 O." See, Respondents' 9/17/15 Response Brief, pg. 17. In addition to the fact
that Employer once again misstates the actual record as set forth above 6, the Court explicitly
rebuffed such administrative maneuvers in setting forth, "A referee may not undiagnose a
claimant before the Commission based on the referee's own lay understanding of what the

6

The unrebutted evidence documents that Dr. Verska was indeed provided with the 2010 history, in that he
reviewed the pertinent 2010 medical records as part of his evaluation and assessment of Wilson. (Dr. Verska Depo
Tr., p. 17, LI. 17 ···· pg. 18, LI. 3).
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referee believes would change a qualified medical professional's diagnosis and professional

opinion." l 54 Idaho at 759 (emphasis added). As such, Dr. V crska's causation opinions stand
unrebutted as a matter of law and fact in this case, thereby satisfying Wilson's burden of proof
under the Act
Employer asserts that the purported "numerous disparities" in the initial 201 I medical
records justifies the Commission's conclusions. See, Respondents' 9/17/15 Response Brief, pg.
12. As previously briefed, any perceived "disparities" or "inconsistencies" in Wilson's initial
2011 medical reports are derivative at best and inconsequential. However, Employer's avowals
highlight the fact that upon deriving these "inconsistencies" from the initial 2011 records, the
Commission proceeded to thereafter summarily discount and/or ignore any other medical
evidence, including the causation opinions provided by Wilson's treating physician/surgeon, Dr.
Christensen, and Dr. Verska, her retained medical expert.

Significantly, in rejecting similar

administrative deliberative methodologies, the Court ruled that the Commission's perceived
inconsistencies derived from "initial reports" must be viewed in the context of the entire record,
including the opinions of the injured worker's treating physician and retained medical experts.
Stevens-AfcAtee v. Potlatch Cmp., 145 Idaho 325, 332, 179 P.3d 288 (2008).

Given the

Commission's failure to deliberate and consider the totality of the evidence as commanded by
the Court, its Conclusions and Order cannot be premised on substantial and competent evidence.
In response to identifying the exact time and place of the subject industrial accident and
injuries, Employer merely embarked on a tenuous interpretation of Hazen and Wynn.
Respondents' 9/17 /15 Response Brief, pg. 14.
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See,

The Court rejected similar elucidations in

Stevens-McAtee.

Stevens-111cAtee v. Potlatch Cmp., 145 Idaho at 332-33. Regardless, the

overwhelming, credible, con-oborated evidence establishes that Wilson experienced

an

unexpected, undersigned and or untoward mishap with the sudden onset of pain in her low back
while shoveling potatoes during an eight (8) hour shift in March of 2011. Thus, the subject
March 16, 2011, incident meets the definition of a work-related "accident" for purposes of the
Act. Stevens-McAtee v. Potlatch Cmp., 145 Idaho at 332-33.
Significantly, with respect to medical causation, Employer completely failed to directly
address Dr. Christensen's medical/surgical records and oral causation opinions, or the controlling
judicial determinations that such are sufficient to satisfy the requirement that medical testimony
be provided on the issue of causation.

In any event, it seems unlikely that Employer could

provide a viable retort, given that the Court deemed, under analogous circumstances, that
comparable evidence is sufficient to meet an injured worker's burden of proof. See generally,
Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 Idaho 160, 997 P .2d 621 (2000). In Jones, the Court noted that
"'[w]here hearsay evidence is admitted without objection, it properly may be considered in
detennining the facts."' Jones v. Emmett N/anor, 134 Idaho at 164. To that end, the Court ruled
that a doctor's medical records setting forth that the injury was brought about by 'lifting
patients,' was sufficient enough that a "reasonable mind may conclude that [the] mJury was
caused by an accident in the course of her employment."

134 Idaho at 164-65 (quotations

original).
The unrebutted record establishes that Wilson presented medical evidence equivalent to
that considered sufficient in Jones and in some instances some which far surpassed such
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recognized substantial and competent evidence.

Specifically, Dr. Christensen's Nurse called

Employer directly on April 11, 2011, and specifically advised as to Wilson's lumbar injuries
from a "shoveling incident three weeks earlier," simultaneously faxing pertinent medical records.
(Tr., p. 140, LL 5-21; p. 142, LL 1-21).

Furthennore, Dr. Christensen explicitly denoted

Wilson's subject March 16, 2011, injuries as "ACCIDENT, EMPLOYMENT RELATED."
See, Hr' g Ex. No. 2, pg. 29 (emphasis added). Additionally, throughout Wilson's treatment and

surgeries following the March 16, 2011, work-related shoveling accident, Dr. Christensen
designated her case under "\Vorkers' Compensation Information" with the "Insurance
Carrier: Sedgewick" and the "Injury Info: She states that she injured her back at work about
3 week[sic] prior to her ER visit when was shoveling potatoes at work." Hr' g Ex. E, pg. 29

(emphasis original) (emphasis added).

In transcending the Jones evidentiary standard, Dr.

Christensen orally opined that the need for the surgeries perfonned on Wilson's low back were
related to the March I 6, 2011, shoveling accident. (Tr., p. 86, LI. I 2-20). As such, in accord
with controlling judicial precedent, Dr. Christensen's records and oral opinions constitute
substantial and competent evidence that a reasonable mind would utilize to conclude that
Wilson's back injuries were caused by the March 16, 2011, shoveling incident at work.
Furthermore, the Commission's declaration that it was "disinclined to believe" Dr. Christensen's
statements seems arbitrary and non-compliant with controlling legal authority. R., pg. 17.
Employer failed to rebut the overwhelming factual, testimonial and medical evidence, or
the controlling legal authority in this case. As such, the Commission's findings/conclusions that
Wilson "lacks substantive credibility, and that she failed to prove the occurrence of the claimed
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untoward mishap 1event of March 16, 2011," as well as "failed to adduce medical proof sufficient
to support a conclusion that her injuries an: the result of a specific accident occurring on March
16, 2011," are not suppo1ied by the record or controlling law.

Thus, these Commission

conclusions are not premised upon substantial and competent evidence, nor controlling legal
authority and as such, its Order "must be set aside." Therefore, if not otherwise rendered moot
by the application of quasi- or judicial estoppel, the Commission's Order should be remanded for
proceedings accordingly.

D.

\Vilson was Deprived of Fundamental Due Process During the Underlying
Administrative Proceedings.

The underlying administrative proceedings seemingly contravened Wilson's due process
rights.

As with the majority of its purported arguments, Employer failed to present any due

process assertions premised upon the application of controlling law to the objective facts in this
case.
Similarly, Employer failed to directly address Wilson's factually and legally based due
process arguments. Conspicuously, Employer failed to dispute, among other things:
•

That the presiding Referee levied ad lwminim attacks against Wilson;

•

That the presiding Referee sua sponte interjected a September/October 2010
defense/theory that only served to benefit Employer;

•

That both the Referee and the Commission attributed a statement to Wilson \vhich
was wholly inaccurate and not reflective of the actual record;

•

That the Referee failed to address Wilson's timely noticed issue of quasi-estoppel;

•

That both the Referee and the Commission failed to address Wilson's timely noticed
issue of judicial estoppel;

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, Page 21

•

Commission sua spontc reframed the actual "injury" quasi-estoppel
raised and argued, to one of an

•

That the Commission sua sponte interjected the September/October 2010
defense/theory that only served to benefit Employer; and

•

That the Commission failed to account for the Foust premises legal presumptions.

Wilson asserts that just the above-referenced administrative actions and/or omissions alone
would seemingly warrant judicial review for due process transgressions.

Further, the

Commission's methodology of utilizing Employer's "September/October 2010" false dichotomy
and its own errant credibility findings as a means to supplant or otherwise discredit Dr. Verska's
unrebutted causation opinions, in and of itself, seems to contravene the Court's admonition that
"Simply, for an agency to rely on facts withheld from the record is a denial of due process."
/Mazzone, 154 Idaho at 761 (emphasis added).

Rather than directly address Wilson's factually and legally premised due process
arguments, Employer portends to give a dissertation as to the nature of litigation and chides that
''It is quite evident that Claimant is hyper-sensitive to this due process argument."

Appellants' 9/17/15 Response Brief, pg. 21.

See,

The obtuse nature of Employer's generic due

process cogitations is evidenced by the assertion, "She is not asserting that the Referee failed to
review her claim or the Commission failed to review her claim."

Id. at pg. 20.

Even a

rudimentary review of Wilson's arguments throughout the appellate process reveals that with
numerous assertions, including "Similarly, the Commission arbitrarily failed to address properly
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noticed and litigated issues," she. in fact made those exact arguments. See, Appellant's 8/19/15
Opening Brief pg. 39.
Simply stated, given the complete lack of substantive merit in Employer's purported due
process assertions, Wilson relies upon the evidence in record and controlling law as previously
briefed. However, in failing to directly address the issue of due process via the actual facts in
evidence and controlling law, Employer seemingly waives and/or concedes that Wilson's due
process rights were transgressed in this case.
E.

The Industrial Commission Erred in Determining that All Remaining Issues
\Vere Moot.

Employer failed to provide any fact-based argument or legal authority related to this issue
and thereby, as a matter of law, waives the issue as cited. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263.
Therefore, the Court should order remand of all remaining issues for impartial deliberation upon
the recorded facts in accord \Vith controlling law.

F.

\Vilson Should be Awarded Attorney Fees and Costs.

Wilson is entitled to an award of attorney fees.

Attorney fees may be recovered for

unreasonable denial of benefits. Specifically, the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act provides in
relevant part:

Attorney's fees - Punitive costs in certain cases. - If the commission or any court
before whom any proceedings are brought under this law detennines that the
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured
employee ... without reasonable ground, or his surety neglected or refused within a
reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay to the
injured employee ... the compensation provided by law ... In all such cases, the
fees of attorneys employed by injured employees . . . shall be fixed by the
comm1ss10n.
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l,C. § 72-804 ( emphasis original). Given the unrebutted facts in evidence and controlling
legal authority in this instant action, Employer's denial of Wilson's claim was entirely
unreasonable.
As set forth infra, the record overwhelmingly establishes that Wilson experienced a
work-related accident while shoveling potatoes in the course and scope of her employment on or
about March 16, 2011.

Moreover, the unrebutted medical evidence/opinions proves that the

March 16, 2011, industrial accident cause Wilson to suffer lumbar injuries/aggravations that
necessitated several surgical interventions.

Finally, it is undeniable that Employer has

deliberately adopted inconsistent positions throughout Title 72 administrative proceedings as
well as these appellate proceedings in an attempt to surreptitiously evade its rightful liability.
"The concept of 'telling the truth' is such an important matter must be imputed to [the party] and
[their attorney]." Jl;fcKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho at 155.
As a matter of reality, Employer's tactics of "playing fast and loose with the courts,"
effectively rendered Wilson and her children 7 destitute, homeless, geographically isolated and
wholly dependent on the mercy andlor charity of others. There is absolutely no way that the
Court's archetype Hagler "pro se" claimant would get any semblance of "attainment of justice"
if faced with these types of manipulations. Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 Idaho 596,
599, 798 P.2d 55 (1990). A party "will not be pennitted to benefit from that deception," as any
other result "would contravene settled Idaho precedent, statutory law and vitiate the humane

7

The Act is designed to provide sure and certain relief for injured workers and their families and dependents. Davaz
v. Priest River Glass Co., 125 Idaho 333, 337, 870 P.2d 1292 (1994).
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which the Workmen's

was intended to fmiher.

130 Idaho at 156;

Therefore, the Court should mvard attorney

v. Kelly Logging, I 15 Idaho at

and

costs to Appellant for all stages of Wilson's claim, including those below, on appeal and any on
remand.
Conversely, Employer makes assertions of entitlement to attorney fees premised upon
generic reference to I.A.R. 11.2 and vague proclamations of "scorched eaith,'' "re-tread old
ground" etc. Conspicuously, as throughout its Response, Employer fails to cite any facts in
evidence, or address any controlling legal mandates, including, but not necessarily limited to, the
three (3) requisites of I.A.R. I 1.2. As set forth in the appellate briefing, Wilson's instant appeal
was brought in good faith and is supported by replete citation to unrebutted facts in conjunction
with controlling legal authority.

Further, the fact that Wilson raised equitable and legal

arguments which the presiding Referee and/or Commission refused to consider, universally
belies the completely unsubstantiated ''re-tread" and "second-guess" banalities. To that end,
some of the legal and equitable arguments posed by Wilson may actually present questions of
first impression for the Court. As such, Employer is not entitled to an award of attorney fees.

V.

CONCLUSION

In consideration of the foregoing argument and authority, Wilson respectfully requests
that the Court: rule that the doctrines of quasi-estoppel and/or judicial estoppel preclude
Employer/Surety, the Commission and/or both from contesting that Wilson suffered industrial
injuries while working for Employer on or about March 16, 201 I; reverse the Commission's
findings that Wilson "lacks substantive credibility, and that she failed to prove the occurrence of
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the claimed untoward mishap 1event of March 16, 2011;" reverse the Commission's conclusion
that Wilson "failed to adduce medical proof sufficient to support a conclusion that her injuries
are the result of a specific accident occurring on March 16, 2011 ;" find that Wilson's due process
rights were violated during the administrative proceedings; reverse the Commission's conclusion
that "All other issues are moot;" award attorney fees and costs to Appellant for all stages of
Wilson's claim, including those below, on appeal and any on remand; and remand for
proceedings consistent therewith.
DATED this CJ ~ay of October, 2015.
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